Part II: Who Controls the Pressure Points in a Multipolar World? What Does That Mean for the Horn of Africa?

Photo Credit: Institute for Security Studies

In this second part, I discuss what the multipolar world would have meant to Africa, how the Trump administration makes this risky, and the role of the EU. You can find Part I of my discussion here.

Africa is not outside global crises—it is downstream of them. Key vulnerabilities include fuel import dependency, fertilizer reliance, and exposure to global price shocks.

It is also a strategic reality. As China expands infrastructure and trade networks, the U.S. seeks security partnerships, and Russia offers military and political support, it creates opportunities—but also risks of dependency. 

While China’s influence in Africa is built on the cold logic of balance sheets and concrete, Russia’s strategy through its Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group) operates on a much more intimate and existential level. By offering regime security—direct protection for leaders against coups, insurgencies, and internal dissent—Moscow creates a high-stakes dependency that infrastructure loans cannot replicate. This praetorian guard model allows Russia to secure access to strategic minerals and political loyalty without the burdensome Western demands for human rights or democratic transparency.

For an African leader, a Chinese-built railway is a long-term asset, but a Russian security detail is a short-term necessity for survival; this shifts Russia’s role from a mere global opportunist to a deeply embedded, personal partner in the domestic power structures of the continent.

The reality of African agency is increasingly defined by a sophisticated brand of multi-alignment, where nations like Kenya and Egypt leverage their unique geopolitical value to play global powers against one another. Rather than choosing a side, these states practice flexible loyalty. Kenya, for instance, has successfully secured major Chinese infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative while simultaneously being designated by Washington as a "Major Non-NATO Ally"—the first in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Egypt maintains a delicate equilibrium, relying on U.S. military aid and F-16s while deepening its BRICS+ ties and commissioning Russian-built nuclear power plants. 

This is not a passive sitting on the fence, but a calculated strategy of competitive bidding. By positioning themselves as indispensable partners to both the West and the East, these nations ensure that they remain beneficiaries of global competition rather than its collateral damage, effectively turning the "New Cold War" into a high-stakes marketplace for their own national interests.

But Trump?!

 While multipolarity theoretically expands strategic options, Donald Trump’s foreign policy paradoxically constrains African states’ ability to diversify alliances.

The Trump administration has redefined the U.S.–Africa relations are explicitly transactional. Africa is increasingly viewed through a resource and deal-making lens, rather than long-term partnership. Diplomacy is tied to commercial returns and reciprocity, not strategic flexibility. This shifts engagement from multilateral cooperation to bilateral bargaining, where power asymmetries are sharper.

Trump-era policies restrict African states’ room to maneuver. Tariffs and reciprocal trade policies undermine preferential access (e.g., AGOA uncertainty). Aid cuts and institutional withdrawals reduce policy autonomy and increase vulnerability. This creates a structural dilemma. African countries must align economically with the U.S. to retain access, limiting their ability to simultaneously deepen ties with China or Russia.

Trump’s administration has shown willingness to penalize countries for independent foreign policy choices. Thus, strategic autonomy may trigger economic retaliation and multipolar balancing carries direct costs.

The U.S. retreat from global leadership further complicates African positioning. Reduced aid and global engagement weaken collective frameworks. Security and development are no longer guaranteed but negotiated. At the same time, the U.S. demands greater alignment without providing systemic stability, creating a contradiction which pushes Africa to “choose” in a system that is supposedly multipolar.

Rather than enabling flexible alignment, Trump’s approach produces compressed strategic space, higher costs for neutrality, and increased dependence on single-power deals.

Even as China, Russia, and Gulf states expand options, U.S. pressure makes true multi-alignment politically and economically risky.

What about UK and Europe?

The UK and Europe sit in a very specific—and somewhat constrained—position in this multipolar framework. They are still security providers and defenders of the global system, but no longer dominant rule-makers. In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, this creates a hybrid role: part stabilizer, part competitor, part declining power trying to remain relevant.

Europe’s primary interest is to keep trade flowing. Around 12% of global trade passes through the Red Sea, linking Asia to Europe. Disruption directly affects European economies, energy supplies, and inflation. As a result, the EU has doubled down on maritime security by launching Operation ASPIDES (2024) to protect shipping, extending it through 2027 to defend freedom of navigation, and reinforcing older missions like Operation Atalanta (anti-piracy).

Recent EU decisions confirm this shift. The EU has expanded naval deployments in response to Red Sea attacks. It is also coordinating more closely with regional and global partners. This means that Europe is acting as a guardian of the system it depends on—but no longer fully controls.

What about the UK? Post-Brexit, the UK is trying to define its role between the U.S. (especially under Trump), Europe, and emerging global competition. In the Red Sea and Horn, the UK is acting in three ways. For one, the UK contributes militarily (e.g., naval deployments after Houthi attacks). It also holds diplomatic influence (e.g., UN “penholder” on Somalia). Further, it maintains historical and political ties across the region. But its limitations are clear. It cannot shape outcomes alone. It must operate through coalitions. The implication is that the UK is a secondary but still influential actor, trying to punch above its weight in a crowded field.

Unlike the U.S., China, or Russia, Europe’s approach is risk-averse, institutional, and security-development focused. This translates to EU policy in the Horn emphasizing peace and stability, economic development, and governance and institution-building. 

This is fundamentally different from China, Russia, and Gulf states. China focuses on  infrastructure and leverage. Russia provides regime security and has military footholds. Gulf states have transactional influence. On the other hand, Europe is trying to preserve order, not rewrite it.

In a multipolar world, Europe has dependence without control. Europe depends heavily on Red Sea trade, but lacks the unilateral power to secure it. Second, is its reliance on the U.S. even with strategic friction: Europe still relies on U.S. military backing, but Trump pressures allies and demands burden-sharing. However, EU responses show hesitation in the Iran war. The EU has called for de-escalation and cautious response to U.S. demands for Hormuz security. The EU also deals with competition with China and Russia. China is expanding economic influence (ports, infrastructure) and Russia is expanding military/security influence. Thus, Europe is caught in a strategic squeeze. It must secure the system, but cannot dominate it—and must compete within it.

Europe’s problem is structural. The Red Sea is economically vital to Europe, but geographically and politically controlled by others. This creates dependence on Coastal states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Sudan), stability in Yemen, and cooperation with Gulf powers. And increasingly, negotiation with non-Western actors. This means that Europe has high exposure but limited sovereignty in the region.

In light of multipolarity,  and the Iran war, Europe represents something deeper. It is the last major actor fully invested in rules-based order. However, that order is eroding under multipolar competition. So, Europe ends up defending shipping lanes, supporting diplomacy and avoiding escalation while others weaponize trade routes, use proxies, and expand influence aggressively.