Part III: Who Controls the Pressure Points in a Multipolar World? What Does That Mean for the Horn of Africa?
The Logic of External Actors in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, and its Impact
None of the behaviors of external powers in the Horn of Africa are accidental. They are shaped by structural incentives, domestic constraints, and deeply embedded strategic cultures. Understanding these logics is essential to explaining why the region is becoming increasingly unstable despite growing global attention. This part III will discuss these issues.
To read part I click here.
To read part II, click here.
The United States: Retrenchment and Transactional Power
The United States—particularly under Donald Trump—has shifted toward strategic retrenchment and cost-benefit calculation. Rather than maintaining a system-building role, U.S. policy increasingly prioritizes influence at an acceptable cost. In practice, this means reduced commitment to global “public goods” such as security provision, greater pressure on allies to assume responsibility, and the preference for short-term deals over long-term alliances.
The Horn of Africa is therefore viewed as instrumental—important for access, transit, and leverage—but not central. While the U.S. remains the most powerful military actor, it is less predictable and less invested in maintaining order. This shift is widely documented in U.S. strategic guidance, including the U.S. National Defense Strategy, which emphasizes prioritization and burden-sharing over expansive global commitments. The implication is that the U.S. compresses the space for neutrality while failing to fully sustain the previous international order.
China: Control Through Connectivity
China operates through a fundamentally different logic rooted in its development model. Its economic growth depends on secure trade routes, stable access to resources, and long-term infrastructure networks. Rather than military confrontation, China pursues influence through infrastructure financing (ports, railways, logistics corridors), long-term commercial agreements, and political non-interference
This approach is embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, which has significantly expanded China’s footprint in East Africa. On the other hand, China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti underscores that economic expansion is increasingly accompanied by selective security presence. The implication is that China seeks control through connectivity—expanding influence quietly while avoiding direct conflict.
China operates through a fundamentally different logic rooted in its development model. Its economic growth depends on secure trade routes, stable access to resources, and long-term infrastructure networks. Rather than military confrontation, China pursues influence through infrastructure financing (ports, railways, logistics corridors), long-term commercial agreements, and political non-interference
This approach is embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, which has significantly expanded China’s footprint in East Africa. On the other hand, China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti underscores that economic expansion is increasingly accompanied by selective security presence. The implication is that China seeks control through connectivity—expanding influence quietly while avoiding direct conflict.
Russia: Influence Through Instability
Russia lacks both the economic scale of China and the institutional reach of the United States. It compensates through security provision to regimes, military access agreements and strategic disruption.
Russia is particularly effective in fragile states, conflict zones, and politically isolated regimes. Its model relies on low-cost, high-impact engagement, often through private military actors such as the Wagner Group, and later Africa Corps. The implication is that Russia does not need stability—it benefits from instability, which creates opportunities for leverage and influence.
Russia lacks both the economic scale of China and the institutional reach of the United States. It compensates through security provision to regimes, military access agreements and strategic disruption.
Russia is particularly effective in fragile states, conflict zones, and politically isolated regimes. Its model relies on low-cost, high-impact engagement, often through private military actors such as the Wagner Group, and later Africa Corps. The implication is that Russia does not need stability—it benefits from instability, which creates opportunities for leverage and influence.
Gulf States: Security Through External Influence
The Gulf powers—especially the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—are driven by geographic vulnerability, dependence on maritime trade routes, and regime security concerns.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is critical to their economic survival. Due to limited manpower but significant financial resources, they project power through port investments, military bases, and proxy networks.
The war in Yemen has already demonstrated how Gulf rivalries extend into the Horn. The Horn is becoming an extension of Gulf geopolitics, with local conflicts increasingly internationalized.
The Gulf powers—especially the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—are driven by geographic vulnerability, dependence on maritime trade routes, and regime security concerns.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is critical to their economic survival. Due to limited manpower but significant financial resources, they project power through port investments, military bases, and proxy networks.
The war in Yemen has already demonstrated how Gulf rivalries extend into the Horn. The Horn is becoming an extension of Gulf geopolitics, with local conflicts increasingly internationalized.
Turkey and Qatar: Competitive Middle Powers
Turkey and Qatar represent an alternative bloc. Turkey combines military presence with ideological alignment (e.g., in Somalia), and increasingly mediation. Qatar relies on mediation and financial diplomacy. Turkey’s largest overseas base in Mogadishu reflects its growing strategic ambition. These actors add another layer of rivalry, further fragmenting alliances in the region.
Turkey and Qatar represent an alternative bloc. Turkey combines military presence with ideological alignment (e.g., in Somalia), and increasingly mediation. Qatar relies on mediation and financial diplomacy. Turkey’s largest overseas base in Mogadishu reflects its growing strategic ambition. These actors add another layer of rivalry, further fragmenting alliances in the region.
The European Union: System Stabilizer Without Hard Power
The European Union is shaped by institutional consensus requirements, its preference for stability and governance, and limited coercive capacity. Its Horn of Africa strategy emphasizes peacebuilding, maritime security, and development assistance. Operations such as Operation ASPIDES focus on protecting shipping rather than projecting power. The EU is a stabilizer, not a power maximizer—strong in diplomacy, weak in coercion.
The United Kingdom: A Bridge Actor
The United Kingdom operates under post-Brexit constraints including reduced institutional backing, continued global ambitions, and limited independent capacity. It therefore aligns closely with the U.S., participates in coalitions and uses diplomacy and selective military engagement. The UK remains relevant but not decisive—acting as a bridge rather than a system leader.
The European Union is shaped by institutional consensus requirements, its preference for stability and governance, and limited coercive capacity. Its Horn of Africa strategy emphasizes peacebuilding, maritime security, and development assistance. Operations such as Operation ASPIDES focus on protecting shipping rather than projecting power. The EU is a stabilizer, not a power maximizer—strong in diplomacy, weak in coercion.
The United Kingdom: A Bridge Actor
The United Kingdom operates under post-Brexit constraints including reduced institutional backing, continued global ambitions, and limited independent capacity. It therefore aligns closely with the U.S., participates in coalitions and uses diplomacy and selective military engagement. The UK remains relevant but not decisive—acting as a bridge rather than a system leader.
System-Level Outcome: A Crowded but Geopolitically Fragmented Region
When these actors are considered together, a clear pattern emerges: Everyone seeks access; no one provides order. As a result, the Horn of Africa is increasingly described as a multipolar testing ground. The actors most capable of stabilizing the system (EU/UK) are the least aggressive. The actors most willing to act aggressively (Russia, Gulf states) benefit from instability.
When these actors are considered together, a clear pattern emerges: Everyone seeks access; no one provides order. As a result, the Horn of Africa is increasingly described as a multipolar testing ground. The actors most capable of stabilizing the system (EU/UK) are the least aggressive. The actors most willing to act aggressively (Russia, Gulf states) benefit from instability.
The Red Sea is no longer just a trade route—it is a transmission belt for global crises. Disruptions linked to tensions in the Strait of Hormuz affect fuel prices, fertilizer supply, and food security. Even short disruptions in shipping routes can significantly impact African economies. Global crises now translate into immediate local shocks.
The Red Sea corridor is also rapidly militarizing. Multiple foreign bases (U.S., China, others) are increasing naval deployments and influencing non-state actors such as the Houthis. This creates fragmented security, overlapping claims, and rising risk of miscalculation. At the same time, conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are becoming interconnected. Local conflicts are no longer local—they are embedded in global rivalries.
In theory, multipolarity should increase choice. In practice, in the Horn of Africa it is producing constrained autonomy. External actors pressure states to align. Economic dependencies limit flexibility. U.S. transactional policies increase the cost of neutrality. This results in more actors—but less real independence.
Ports, corridors, and chokepoints are no longer just economic assets—they are tools of power. Control over logistics now determines trade flows, military access, and political leverage. This raises the stakes of port development, maritime claims, and initiatives such as Ethiopia’s push for sea access
The Horn is increasingly a systemic conflict environment. Conflicts are interconnected. External actors back opposing sides Escalation risks are regional, not local. A renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, would likely trigger broader geopolitical involvement.
The Horn of Africa faces a fundamental contradiction: It is becoming more globally important but structurally unstable. Multipolar competition brings investment, infrastructure development, strategic attention but also fragmentation, external coercion, increased risk of conflict.
The Red Sea corridor is also rapidly militarizing. Multiple foreign bases (U.S., China, others) are increasing naval deployments and influencing non-state actors such as the Houthis. This creates fragmented security, overlapping claims, and rising risk of miscalculation. At the same time, conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are becoming interconnected. Local conflicts are no longer local—they are embedded in global rivalries.
In theory, multipolarity should increase choice. In practice, in the Horn of Africa it is producing constrained autonomy. External actors pressure states to align. Economic dependencies limit flexibility. U.S. transactional policies increase the cost of neutrality. This results in more actors—but less real independence.
Ports, corridors, and chokepoints are no longer just economic assets—they are tools of power. Control over logistics now determines trade flows, military access, and political leverage. This raises the stakes of port development, maritime claims, and initiatives such as Ethiopia’s push for sea access
The Horn is increasingly a systemic conflict environment. Conflicts are interconnected. External actors back opposing sides Escalation risks are regional, not local. A renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, would likely trigger broader geopolitical involvement.
The Horn of Africa faces a fundamental contradiction: It is becoming more globally important but structurally unstable. Multipolar competition brings investment, infrastructure development, strategic attention but also fragmentation, external coercion, increased risk of conflict.
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